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It is believed that superselection rules in quantum mechanics can restrict the possible operation
on a qbit. If this was true, the model used by Mayers for the impossibility of bit commitment and
by Kitaev for the impossibility of coin flipping would be inadequate. We explain why this is not the
case. We show that a charge superselection rule implies no restriction on the operations that can
be executed on any individual qbit.
It is well known that superselection rules restrict the
allowed operations in quantum mechanics. Therefore, it
is natural to suggest [1, 2] that the models used by May-
ers to prove the impossibility of bit commitment [3] and
by Kitaev for the impossibility of coin flipping [4] are in-
adequate. Here, we show that to the contrary the models
originally used by Kitaev and Mayers for their respective
impossibility proofs are valid even in the context of su-
perselection rules.
Superselection rules are associated with conserved
quantities such as the number of fermions. Let HF be
the span of |0〉F and |1〉F , a 0 fermion state and a 1
fermion state, respectively. Let HB be the polarisation
state space of a photon. It may appear impossible to
execute the swap gate S on HF ⊗ HB which executes
|x〉F |y〉B ↔ |y〉F |x〉B because the fermion number is not
preserved when x 6= y. The basic idea to unvalidate this
argument can be understood with an analogy with a com-
mon phenomena which also appears to violate a conserva-
tion law. Consider a photon that is reflected by a mirror.
The dynamic of the photon, if considered separately, is
essentially a unitary transformation which violates the
preservation of momemtum. Of course, momentum is
preserved because the mirror absorbs the difference in
momemtum. Yet the mirror does not get entangled with
the photon. The mirror can be considered as a catal-
yser for a unitary transformation that would otherwise
be impossible because it violates a conservation law. In
a similar way, we will show that by using extra degrees
of freedom as a catalyser, we can execute the swap oper-
ation on HF ⊗HB, an operation that would otherwise be
impossible. This swap operation share a similarity with
the reflection of a photon on a mirror. However, this
swap operation is more powerful because, as we will see,
it implies that all operations on HF ⊗ HE , where HE
is any extra system, are allowed despite superselection
rules.
There is a subtle point here. The state of these ex-
tra degrees of freedom must itself be a superposition of
states with different fermion numbers. The existence of
such initial states in nature would not violate any conver-
sation law by itself. For example, even tough momemtum
is a conserved quantity, a superposition of states with dif-
ferent momemtum is a common phenomena. Neverthe-
less, one might ask if such states really exist in the case
of all conservation laws. It turns out that, if these initial
states are not allowed, the original proof that bit commit-
ment is impossible can easily be generalized. Therefore,
in both cases, the conclusion is essentially the same. In
this paper, we focus on the case where initial states of
the form (1/
√
2)(|0〉F + |1〉F ) are allowed, but the easier
case where such a superposition is not allowed will be
considered also.
There is a similarity between the constraint imposed
by the fermion number conservation superselection rule
and the one imposed by the use of classical information
in quantum protocols. In both cases, it was believed for
some times that the constraint could perhaps be used
to build a bit commitment protocol. In both cases, it
turned out to be useless. Before the general impossibil-
ity result, we knew that bit commitment was impossible
if we accept the model where classical information can be
manipulated as if it was quantum information [5, 6]. Of
course, researchers seriously looked for a bit commitment
protocol that makes use of the additional constraint asso-
ciated with classical information. The proof that this ad-
ditional constraint cannot help is not so complicated but
yet it took six months and many unsuccessful attempts
before the author realised that classical information was
actually useless [3]. In the case of the fermion number
conservation superselection rule, a few researchers also
attempted to make use of the corresponding additional
constraint [2], but it took only a few weeks in this case to
realize that the additional constraint is useless, and this
is the subject of the current paper.
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of superse-
lection rules in quantum cryptography. It is interesting
to see that our analysis is inspired by a very simple phe-
nomena, the reflexion of a photon in a mirror. We will
not refer to this simple phenomena anymore, but any-
one who knows why the mirror is not entangled with the
photon should appreciate some connection. In the first
section, we describe the model which includes superse-
lection rules. In the second section, we show that, if
arbitrarily small errors are ignored, this model implies
no restriction on the possible operations on a given qbit.
The Model
We assume that the Hilbert space H(all) for the pro-
tocol is the span of a set of orthogonal states
|(qx)x∈M〉(all) = ⊗x∈M|qx〉(x),
2where M is the set of possible modes and, for every
x ∈ M, qx ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , qmaxx } where qmaxx = 1 for
fermion modes and qmaxx depends on the protocol for bo-
son modes. The state space H(all) is simply the ordinary
tensor product of the state spaces Hx associated with the
modes x ∈M. A superselection rule does not change the
state spaceH(all), but restricts the possible operations on
this space.
Superselection rules. A superselection rule R requires
that, for a subset MR ⊆ M, the quantity QR =∑
x∈MR
qx is preserved by every allowed transformation.
More precisely, the allowed unitary transformations are
block diagonal and each block is associated with a given
value for QR. We assume that every participant has
access to a countably infinite number of extra modes
x ∈ MR which are normally not used in the protocol
(i.e., normally, qx = 0 for these modes). For example,
these extra modes can lie in some unused locations on
the participant’s side.
Local transformations. We assume that M is parti-
tioned between Alice and Bob in two subsets of modes
MA andMB. We denote HA the span of the orthogonal
states
|(qx)x∈MA〉(A) = ⊗x∈MA |qx〉(x).
Similarly, we denoteHB the span of the orthogonal states
|(qx)x∈MB〉(B) = ⊗x∈MB |qx〉(x).
We have Hall = HA ⊗ HB. Locally, Alice can only ex-
ecute unitary transformations of the form UA ⊗ I which
moreover respect the superselection rules. Locally, Bob
can only execute unitary transformations of the form
I⊗UB which moreover respect the superselection rules.
Measurements. Alice has access to a countably infinite
set of “free” modesMAF ⊆MA−MR. Similarly, Bob has
access to a countably infinite set of “free” modes MBF ⊆
MB −MR. We denote MF = MAF ∪ MBF . Without
loss of generality, we assume that only the Hilbert spaces
HAF = ⊗xMAFHx and HBF = ⊗xMBFHx can be measured
by Alice and Bob, respectively. However, there is no
restriction on these measurements.
Communication. Alice communicates information to
Bob by transferring control over a mode x ∈ MA to Bob.
Before the communication, we have x ∈ MA. After the
communication, we have x ∈ MB. Note that the sets
MA and MB can change during the execution of the
protocol, but the sets MR and MF are fixed.
Why there is no restriction on the possible
operations
It may appear that a superselection rule R restricts
the possible operations on every state space Hx associ-
ated with a mode x ∈ MR. However, in fact, the re-
striction only applies to the tensor product ⊗x∈MRHx,
not to each state space Hx individually. We will show
that, if a participant has access to as many extra unused
modes in MR as needed, the superselection rule R im-
poses essentially no restriction on the operations that can
be executed by this participant on a given state space Hx
with x ∈ MR. We will only do the case where Hx is a
qbit, but the generalisation to higher dimensions is not
difficult.
Consider the most general qbit state α|0〉(x) + β|1〉(x)
for a mode x. We will show how the participant can
swap this state with the state of a free mode z initially
in the state |0〉(z). The swapping will only be approxi-
mative, but it will be arbitrarily close to perfect. The
participant uses n − 1 extra modes ~y = y1, . . . , yn−1
and prepares the state (1/
√
n)
∑n−1
j=0 |j〉(~y) where |j〉(~y) =
|1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0〉(~y) contains exactly j modes y1, . . . yj
with qyj = 1. The overall state is
(1/
√
n)(α|0〉(x) + β|1〉(x))⊗ (
n−1∑
j=0
|j〉(~y))⊗ |0〉(z)
which can be rewritten as
(1/
√
n)(α|0, 0, 0〉(x,~y,z) + β|1, n− 1, 0〉(x,~y,z)
+
n−1∑
j=1
α|0, j, 0〉(x,~y,z) + β|1, j − 1, 0〉(x,~y,z)).
Now, each term α|0, j, 0〉(x,~y,z)+β|1, j−1, 0〉(x,~y,z) in the
sum have QR = j. Any operation that preserves QR
is allowed. In particular, the operation S on Hx ⊗ H~y
that executes the swapping |0, j〉(x,~y) ↔ |1, j−1〉(x,~y), for
j = 1, . . . , n − 1, is allowed. For 1 ≤ QR ≤ n − 1, the
participant can execute the following. First, he executes
a CNOT with the mode x as the source and the free mode
z as the target. For QR = j, we obtain the component
α|0, j, 0〉(x,~y,z) + β|1, j − 1, 1〉(x,~y,z)).
Next, conditioned on the free mode z, he executes the
swapping S. For QR = j, we obtain the component
α|0, j, 0〉(x,~y,z) + β|0, j, 1〉(x,~y,z))
= |0, j〉(x,~y) ⊗ (α|0〉(z) + β|1〉(z)).
If we sum all the components, the resulting state is
(1/
√
n)(α|0, 0, 0〉(x,~y,z) + β|1, n− 1, 0〉(x,~y,z)
+|0〉(x) ⊗ (
n−1∑
j=1
|j〉(~y))⊗ (α|0〉(z) + β|1〉(z)).
Note that we have Pr(QR = 0) = α
2/n, Pr(QR = n) =
β2/n and Pr(QR = j) = 1/n, for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, as
expected. No conservation law is violated. Fortunately,
this state is arbitrarily close to the state
(1/
√
n− 1)|0〉(x) ⊗ (
n−1∑
j=1
|j〉(~y))⊗ (α|0〉(z) + β|1〉(z))
3which corresponds to a swapping of the two modes x and
z. This state corresponds to the distribution of probabil-
ity Pr(QR = j) = 1/(n − 1), j = 1, . . . , n − 1, which is
arbitrarily close to the actual distribution of probability
associated with the true final state. So, the participant
has essentially executed a swap operation Sx↔z between
the two modes x and z, despite the fact that z is a free
mode and x is apparently restricted by a superselection
rule.
Let HE be the state space of some extra system. It
is not difficult to see that, given such a swap operation,
one can execute the most general transformation U on
Hx ⊗ HE . First, one execute the swap operation Sx↔z
on Hx ⊗ Hz . Second, one executes U on Hz ⊗ HE in
the same way it would have been executed on Hx ⊗HE .
Finally, one execute the inverse swap operation S†x↔z on
Hx ⊗Hz .
The easier case
Now, we consider the easier case in which an initial
superposition of states with different values for the con-
served quantity is not allowed. Note that, on Alice’s
side, a mixture of different values for QAR can be purified
with a state that has a fixed value for QAR, the maxi-
mum of the possible values for QAR in the mixture. The
samething is true on Bob’s side. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can restrict the analysis to protocols in which
the initial state on both sides is such a purification in-
stead of a mixture. The attack will use the purification,
but this is fine because a cheater against a non purified
protocol can himself create such a purification in place
of the mixture. This is essentially the same purification
technique as in the original proof which ignored super-
selection rules. The difference is that here, in addition,
we make sure that all states in the initial superposition
have the same value for the conserved quantity. Let QAR
and QBR be the fixed value for the conserved quantity
on Alice’s side and Bob’s side, respectively. Because the
protocol is known by both parties, we have that QAR and
QBR and thus QR = Q
A
R +Q
B
R is known by both parties.
The fact that bit commitment is impossible in the model
where QR is fixed and known by both parties was proven
independently by Kitaev [2] and the author. The two
proofs are completely different. Here we present the au-
thor’s proof. We assume that the protocol is perfectly
concealing and show that Alice can swap bit 0 to bit 1.
The generalization to the inexact case is not difficult.
After the commit phase, the overall state of the pro-
tocol associated with an honest commitment of bit w ∈
{0, 1} can be written as Ψ(w) = ∑QRk=0
√
pk(w)ψk(w)
where
ψk(w) = |Λ|−1/2
∑
λ∈Λ
φAλ,k(w) ⊗ φBλ,k(w).
and φAλ,k(w) and φ
B
λ,k(w) are states with Q
A
R = k and
QBR = QR−k, respectively. Both Alice and Bob can mea-
sure k. Because the protocol is concealing, we have that
pk(0) = pk(1) for every k because otherwise k provides
information about w. Let ρBk (w) = TrA(|ψk(w)〉〈ψk(w)|)
be the residual density matrix on Bob’s side associated
with a given k and w. Since Bob can measure k and then
try to distinguish ρBk (0) and ρ
B
k (1) to obtain information
about w, we have that ρBk (0) = ρ
B
k (1), for every k. The
impossibility of bit commitment applies to each k indi-
vidually. Therefore, conditioned on k, Alice can execute
a unitary transformation on her side which maps every
ψk(0) exactly into ψk(1). Because the different ψk(w)
are in a superposition, the relative phase between these
states is important. This is not a problem because Al-
ice has control over this relative phase and she knows
exactly the states ψk(w), including their relative phase.
This concludes the proof.
Discussion
We have shown that a charge conservation superselec-
tion rule imposes no constraint on the allowed operations
on every single qbit. Therefore, even though neither Ki-
taev or Mayers were aware of this fact at the time [2],
the models that they used in their respective impossibil-
ity proofs are actually valid even in the context of such
a superselection rule. In this way, we have addressed the
specific concern mentioned by Popescu [1]. It should be
possible to generalize this result to superselection rules
that are based on more general conservation laws. An
impossibility proof is no more general than the model
used. This is not at all a new understanding for the au-
thor. In computational complexity, many models were
considered and only then Church and Turing proposed
their general thesis that all reasonable models are equiv-
alent for the purpose of computation. The lesson that
we learned here is that we should be careful in quantum
cryptography before we propose this kind of thesis for
quantum protocols.
On the experimental side, in view of our result, one
may ask whether or not it is experimentally difficult to
swap a fermion mode and the polarization of a photon.
This question is irrelevant if we are interested in un-
conditional security, but nevertheless it is an interest-
ing question in itself. We suspect that it is difficult and
this may have lead some people to the wrong conclu-
sion that it is fundamentally prohibited by a conserva-
tion law. The required state (1/
√
n)
∑n−1
j=0 |j〉(~y) can in
principle be prepared with a non zero probability. One
simply creates the state ⊗n−1j=0 (1/
√
2)(|0〉(yj)+|1〉(yj)) and
then do a projection on the desired state. The probabil-
ity of success is small but more efficient algorithms can
most likely be designed. In any case, in the context of
unconditional security, efficiency is not an issue. How-
ever, it is not clear whether or not the individual states
(1/
√
2)(|0〉(yj) + |1〉(yj)) are available in nature. More-
over, a fully functional quantum computer might not help
4because it might not be able to manipulate systems that
are restricted by the superselection rule.
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